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Abstract
Polar amplification is an established scientific fact which has been
associated with the surface albedo feedback and to heat and moisture
transport from the Equator to the Poles. In this paper we unify a
two-box climate model, which allows for heat and moisture transport
from the southern region to the northern region, with an economic
model of welfare optimization. Our main contribution is to show that
by ignoring spatial heat and moisture transport and the resulting polar
amplification, the regulator may overestimate or underestimate the tax
on GHG emissions. The direction of bias depending on the relations
between marginal damages from temperature increase in each region.
We also determine the welfare cost when a regulator mistakenly ignores
polar amplification. Finally we show the adjustments necessary to
the market discount rate due to transport phenomena as well as how
our two-box model can be extended to Ramsey-type optimal growth
models. Numerical simulations confirm our theoretical results.
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Introduction

In a recent contribution, Dietz and Stern (2015) pointed out that ”it is
important to stress that the science of climate change was running years
ahead of the economics (something that arguably remains the case today in
understanding the impacts of climate change).” A well-established fact in
the science of climate change is that when the climate cools or warms, high
latitude regions tend to exaggerate the changes seen at lower latitudes. This
effect is called polar amplification.1 Polar amplification has been associated
with the surface albedo feedback (SAF), by which global warming leads to
snow and ice melt and thus greater absorbtion of solar energy, but recent
research2 suggests that significant polar amplification may also emerge as a
result of atmospheric heat transport, even without SAF.
Polar amplification and spatial heat transport across the globe are parts
of the science of climate change that have been largely ignored by the economics of climate science. The purpose of this paper is to introduce polar
amplification and spatial heat transport into an economic model of climate
change and explore the impacts on the design of climate policy from ignoring these factors, when in reality they are present and affect the evolution
of climate.
Alexeev and Jackson (2012, 2013) develop a useful two-box model that
presents mechanisms of heat transport, polar magnification, and ice line
movement effects due to outside forcing along with a simple treatment of
moisture transport. The two boxes represent the higher latitudes in box 2
(30◦ N to 90◦ N) and the lower latitudes in box 1 (0◦ N to 30◦ N).3 The Alexeev
1

As Langen and Alexeev (2007) point out, polar amplification is seen in model projections of future climate (e.g. Holland and Bitz 2003, ACIA 2004) and, in fact, in the very
earliest simple model of CO2-induced climate change (Arrhenius 1896). Polar amplification is found in proxy-records of both deep past warm periods (e.g., Zachos et al. 2001)
and of the more recent cold glacials (e.g., Masson-Delmotte et al. 2006).
2
See for example Langen and Alexeev (2007) and Alexeev and Jackson (2012) and the
references there in. Winton (2006) and Alexeev and Jackson (2012) compares the strength
of ice-line feedback effects, i.e. Surface Albedo Feedback (SAF), to heat and moisture
transport effects upon polar amplification. They argue that heat and moisture transport
effects, independent of SAF effects, contribute importantly to polar amplification. The
simple two-box model makes it easy to compute the Polar Amplification Factor which is
the ratio of temperature change in the high latitude box to the global average temperature
change for the whole planet.
3
Brock and Xepapadeas (2015) use a more realistic energy balance model because
it models the Earth by a continuum of latitudes and considers heat transport across
latitudes, i.e., it has a “continuum of boxes” with heat transport across each. However,
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and Jackson (2012) and Langen and Alexeev (2007) two-box models allow
us to treat heat transport and also to use elementary mathematics at the
price of simplifications. Their two-box models are useful as a quick way of
making the following points.
First, if we denote the temperature anomaly, i.e. the change in temperature relative to a given benchmark temperature, in each box or region by
T1 and T2 respectively, the relaxation time of the box anomaly temperature
gradient, T1 −T2 , is faster than the relaxation time of the box anomaly global
mean temperature, (T1 + T2 ) /2 (Langen and Alexeev 2007, equation (23).
Thus we should look out for a faster response to forcing of polar amplification than global mean temperature in more complicated models like Brock
and Xepapadeas (2015). This difference is economically relevant for damages related to temperature differences across different latitudes in contrast
to damages related to the planetary global average temperature.4
Therefore polar amplification apart from its importance for climate science, also is important for the economics of climate change. In particular,
polar amplification causes loss of Arctic sea ice which in turn has consequences for melting land ice along with other effects. There is growing evidence suggesting rapid Arctic warming relative to the Northern hemisphere
mid-latitudes. This phenomenon has been called Arctic amplification and
is expected to increase the frequency of extreme weather events (Francis
and Vavrus 2014). Melting land ice associated with a potential meltdown of
Greenland and West Antarctica ice sheets due to polar amplification might
cause serious global sea level rise. It is estimated that the Greenland ice
sheet holds an equivalent of 7 metres of global sea level rise, while the West
Antarctica ice sheet holds the potential for up to 3.5 metres of global sea
level rise (see Lenton et al. 2008).5 On the other hand, the loss of Arctic
sea ice due to the Arctic amplification may generate economic benefits by
making possible the exploitation of natural resources and fossil fuel reserves
which are not accessible now because of the sea ice. Another source of
damages caused by polar amplification relates to the thawing of permafrost.
more advanced mathematics is required for this analysis.
4
Brock and Xepapadeas (2015, equations (19) and (20)) show that the response of the
difference is indeed faster than the response of global mean temperature.
5
In the discussion about tipping points it has been stressed that the time scale of
melting of the Greenland ice sheet is much longer than Arctic sea ice melting. However
the Antarctic ice sheet could melt very fast once it gets started, but it will need an increase
of 5◦ C of surface temperature to cause a serious destabilization.
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Permafrost or permafrost soil is soil at or below the freezing point of
water (0◦ C or 32◦ F) for two or more years. Permafrost regions occupy approximately 22.79 million square kilometers (about 24 percent of the exposed
land surface) of the Northern Hemisphere (Zhang et al. (2003)). Permafrost
occurs as far north as 84◦ N in northern Greenland, and as far south as 26◦ N
in the Himalayas, but most permafrost in the Northern Hemisphere occurs
between latitudes of 60◦ N and 68◦ N. (North of 67◦ N, permafrost declines
sharply, as the exposed land surface gives way to the Arctic Ocean.) Recent
work investigating the permafrost carbon pool size estimates that 1400-1700
Gt of carbon is stored in permafrost soils worldwide. This large carbon pool
represents more carbon than currently exists in all living things and twice as
much carbon as exists in the atmosphere (Tarnocai et al. (2009)). Thawing
of permafrost caused by polar amplification is expected to bring widespread
changes in ecosystems, increase erosion, harm subsistence livelihoods, and
damage buildings, roads, and other infrastructure. Loss of permafrost will
also cause release of greenhouse gases with global effects. Issues, therefore,
such as melting of land ice or thawing of permafrost suggest that polar
amplification might be an important factor in the effort to design efficient
climate policies.

6

In this context, the two-box models help to focus our attention on economic cross effects of temperature increases in the higher latitudes upon the
lower latitudes, as well as the economic effects of temperature increases for
each latitude. We shall see that the sign of the derivative of total energy
use and, hence, emissions, w.r.t. the rate of spatial transport of heat energy
from the lower to the higher latitudes, depends upon the difference between
the marginal damages caused by temperature increase at the high latitudes
and the temperature increase at the lower latitudes. Furthermore it is easy
to see the economics interacting with climate science in the two-box model
to illustrate the importance of taking into account heat and moisture transport from the lower latitudes to the higher latitudes. For example, we show
that neglect of transport effects leads to overstating (understating) how big
carbon taxes should be if marginal damages from one degree temperature
increases are smaller (larger) at the higher latitudes compared to the lower
latitudes.
6

Melting of land ice and permafrost thawing are reletaed to the concept of damage
reservoirs. (see Brock et al. 2014a)
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With hindsight this insight into climate economics is quite clear but the
two box model does a nice job of helping us to see it. To put it another way,
if humans could move heat energy to where it does the least damage, then
carbon taxes would be lower compared to a world where this ability to move
heat energy around at will was absent. Since the real climate system moves
heat energy from the lower latitudes to the higher latitudes, the direction of
transport is fixed by the climate system. This directionality of heat energy
and moisture transport interacting with the pattern of relative marginal
damages from temperature increases across latitudes determines the bias in
optimal carbon taxes. As we show below, neglecting what climate science
knows about heat and moisture transport in Integrated Assessment Modeling in climate economics can, theoretically, lead to serious biases in recommended carbon taxes, in estimates of welfare effects from climate change.
While we are able to use theory to isolate potential directions and strengths
of these biases, and to make plausible qualitative statements about their
potential sizes, serious calibration and computational work is needed to get
quantitative estimates. That is beyond the scope of this article.
Third, and most important, we shall see that all relevant quantities are
functions of the optimal carbon tax rate, τ ≡ −λ (λT1 + λT2 ), where λ is the
global mean average temperature increase per unit of cumulative emissions,
and −λTi , i = 1, 2 are the shadow prices of a unit of extra emissions for latitude belts i = 1, 2 where lower latitude belts are indexed by lower numbers.
We create a “how much spatial heat transport matters index” by taking the
ratio of the value of τ when there is spatial heat transport to the value of
τ when spatial transport is zero. We shall see below that “space matters”
when the high latitude share of marginal damages deviates from 21 .
Thus the main contribution of this paper, apart from introducing a more
realistic climate model to the economic modeling of climate change, is to
show that by using this model, economic policy which does not account for
heat and moisture transport will be incirrect unless the shares of high to low
latitude damages are the same. Since this damage structure is rather restrictive, while heat and moisture transport are real phenomena, our approach
provides insights into the ways that economic policy for climate change
should be corrected so that it is founded on solid climate science. Furthermore, we show how the welfare cost of incorrect policy can be calculated
and how heat and moisture transport affects discount rates used in the Cost
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Figure 1: The two-box energy balance model
Benefit Analysis of projects in low and high latitudes. Although in our main
analytical framework we are abstracting away from the problem of optimal
capital accumulation, we show in the last section how our analysis can be
extended to Ramsey-type optimal growth models.

2

A two-box energy balance model with anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses

The two-box energy balance model introduced by Langen and Alexeev (2007)
and Alexeev and Jackson (2012) consists of a single hemisphere with two
boxes or regions divided by the 30th latitude, which yields similar surface
area of the two boxes. Following Langen and Alexeev (2007), the two-box
model is presented below.
In figure 1, TxT , x = 1, 2 is the surface temperature in each box, with
1 denoting the lower latitude and 2 the higher latitude. This temperature
is defined as the sum of equilibrium, or baseline, average temperature in
each box (Tb1 , Tb2 ) when anthropogenic forcing through emissions of GHGs
is zero, plus the temperature anomaly (T1 , T2 ) . Thus Tx = TxT −Txb . By the
definition of the boxes (or regions), the baseline average yearly temperatures
(Tb1 , Tb2 ) satisfy the inequality T1b > T2b . The downwelling short wave
radiation in each region is denoted by Sx , the outgoing longwave radiation
6

by A + BTx , the heat transport from box 1 to box 2 by T r and the stock of
greenhouse gases created by anthropogenic emissions by GHG. This stock
traps part of the outgoing longwave radiation. In the two-box model the
ocean mixed layer has a depth of Hd , density ρd , and heating capacity cw ,
thus we denote by H = πa2e ρd cw Hd the heat capacity in each of the boxes.
Assuming no anthropogenic forcing, the evolution of the surface temperature
in each box is:
Ṫ1T

=

Ṫ2T

=

1
(S1 − A − BT1T − T r)
H
1
(S2 − A − BT2T + T r) .
H

(1)
(2)

The meridional heat transport is defined in terms of the temperature
anomaly as:
T r = T r + γ 1 (T1 − T2 ) + γ 2 T1 .

(3)

In (??) the first term is the equilibrium heat transport, the second term
captures the increase in transport due to increasing baroclinicity,7 while
the third term captures the effect of an increased moisture supply and thus
greater latent heat transport with increased low- to mid-latitude temperatures. In the dynamical system (??)-(??), we use the parametrization of
Alexeev et al. (2005) and add anthropogenic forcing as in Alexeev and Jackson (2012). The anthropogenic forcing is assumed to be ∆f (t) = λE (t) for
all dates t following Matthews et al. (2009) and MacDougal and Friedlingstein (2015), where λ is their cumulative carbon response parameter and
E (t) = E (1, t) + E (2, t) is global GHGs emissions at date t. Emissions can
also be interpreted by appropriate choice of units as fossil fuel use. Global
emissions are defined as the sum of emissions in box 1,E (1, t) , and box 2,
E (2, t), Under these assumptions the dynamical system (??)-(??) can be
expressed in terms of the evolution of the temperature anomaly in each box
as:
7

In meteorology a baroclinic atmosphere is one for which the density depends on both
the temperature and the pressure. In a barotropic atmosphere, on the other hand, the
density depends only on the pressure. In atmospheric terms, the barotropic zones of the
Earth are generally found in the central latitudes, or tropics, whereas the baroclinic areas
are generally found in the mid-latitude/polar regions.
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1
[(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + ∆f ] , T1 (0) = 0
H
1
=
[(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + ∆f ] , T2 (0) = 0
H
= λE (t) , E (t) = E (1, t) + E (2, t) .

Ṫ1 =

(4)

Ṫ2

(5)

∆f

(6)

It can easily be seen from (??)-(??) that when γ 2 = 0 the steady state
temperature anomaly between low and high latitudes is the same, that the
ratio between low latitude warming and high latitude warming is one. On
the other hand, in a steady state where γ 2 > 0, the ratio is greater than
one. Thus the term γ 2 T1 in (??) breaks symmetry.
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Social Welfare Optimization under Polar Amplification

To study optimal climate policy in the context of the two-box climate model
described above, we consider a simple welfare maximization problem with
logarithmic utility, where world welfare is expressed by the sum of welfare
in each region and is given by:
Z

∞

t=0

e−ρt

"x=2
X

#
i
h
α −φ(x,Tb +T )
dt,
v (x) L (x, t) ln y (x, t) E (x, t) e

(7)

x=1

where y (x, t) E (x, t)α , 0 < α < 1, E (x, t) , Tbi (x, t) , Ti (x, t) L (x, t) are
output per capita, fossil fuel input or emissions of GHGs, baseline temperature, temperature anomaly and fully employed population in each region x
at date t, respectively. The term e−φ(x,Tb +T ) , Tb + T = (Tb1 + T1 , Tb2 + T2 )
reflects damages to output per capita in region x = 1, 2 from an increase in
the temperature anomaly in either region, since polar amplification in region 2 might generate damages to region 1. We assume that y (x, t) , L (x, t)
are exogenously given. That is, we are abstracting away from the problem
of optimally accumulating capital inputs and other inputs in order to focus sharply on optimal fossil fuel taxes. In this context y (x, t) could be
interpreted as the component of a Cobb-Douglas production function that
embodies all other inputs along with technical change that evolve exogenously. Finally, v (x) represents welfare weights associated with box (or
8

region ) x.
Assuming that each region has its own fossil fuels reserves, denoted by
R0 (x) , the resource constraint for each region becomes:
∞

Z

E (x, t) dt ≤ R0 (x) , x = 1, 2.

(8)

t=0

The welfare optimization problem is, therefore, to choose the fossil fuel
(or GHG emissions) path to maximize (??) subject to (??)-(??) and (??). To
simplify and allow study of the property of optimal steady states, we assume
that L (x, t) = L (x) , y (x, t) = y (x) , x = 1, 2 for all dates.8 Dropping the
term v (x) L (x, t) ln y (x, t) , which does not affect optimality conditions, the
current value Hamiltonian function for the welfare maximization problem
becomes:
H =

x=2
X


v (x) L(x) [α ln E (x, t) − φ (x, Tb + T )] − λR0x E (x, t) + (9)

x=1

1
[(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + λ [E (1, t) + E (2, t)]] +
H
1
λT2 [(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + λ [E (1, t) + E (2, t)]]
H
Tb = (Tb1 , Tb2 ) , T = (T1 , T2 ) .
λT1

The following first order necessary Conditions (FONC) for the optimal
choice of fossil fuel (or emissions) use can be obtained by differentiating the
Hamiltonian w.r.t. E (x, t),
−λ

αv (x) L (x)
E (x, t)

=

E (x, t) =

P

2
i=1 λTi

(t)



+ λR0x (t) , or
H
−αv (x) L (x) H
h
P

i , x = 1, 2.
2
λ
(t)
−λ
+
λ
(t)
X
T
i
R
i=1

(10)
(11)

0

If we assume that both regions share the total initial fossil fuel reserves,
then resource constraints (??) should be replaced by the single constraint
Z

∞

Z
E (t) dt =

t=0

x=2
∞X

E (x, t) dt ≤ R0 , R0 = R (1) + R (2) .

(12)

t=0 x=1

8

We could also have assumed that L and y grow exponentially and have their growth
rates absorbed into the utility discount rate.

9

Then the multipliers λR0x (t) should be replaced by the single multiplier
λR0 (t) in the FONC (??).
It can be seen from (??) that the externality tax associated with anthropogenic emissions of GHGs is:
−λ

P

2
i=1 λTi

τ (t) =

H


(t)
.

(13)

Note that the externality tax is likely to increase as the cumulative carbon response parameter, λ, of Matthews et al. (2009) increases and the
heat capacity decreases H. Of course we must take into account changes
in these parameters upon the temperature co-states in order to get the total effect on the externality tax. Under our simplifying assumptions to be
stated below, the shadow prices of emissions turn out to be constants over
time. Thus τ is a useful “sufficient parameter” for all the quantities that are
policy-relevant. That is, the emissions at each set of latitude belts, x = 1, 2,
the optimal “price” path of reserves, R0 (x), and optimal welfare are all
functions of τ , as we shall see below.
Furthermore if fossil fuel reserves plus anticipated new discoveries in each
region are infinite, then λR0x (t) = 0 for all dates t, and x = 1, 2 or λR0 (t) = 0
for all dates t, if we consider the case in which the two regions share infinite
reserves. If the reserves are finite, then their shadow price λR0 rises at the
rate ρ over time. When the initial reserve plus anticipated new discoveries
is finite, the initial value λR0 (0) is set by the resource constraints,
Z

∞

Z
E (x, t) dt = R0 (x) , x = 1, 2, or

t=0

x=2
∞X

E (x, t) dt = R0 .

(14)

t=0 x=1

In order to obtain some straightforward insights about the interaction of
climate and economics in the simplest possible setting, we restrict ourselves
to the case in which

∂φ(x,Tb +T )
∂Ti

is constant for all x = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2 .

Assumption 1: Define marginal damage cost of temperature increase
in box x = 1, 2 by
di = d1i + d2i =

x=2
X

v (x) L (x)

x=1
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∂φ (x, Tb + T )
, i = 1, 2.
∂Ti

(15)

where
v (1) L(1)φ (1, Tb + T ) = d11 (Tb1 + T1 ) + d12 (Tb2 + T2 )

(16)

v (2) L(2)φ (2, Tb + T ) = d21 (Tb1 + T1 ) + d22 (Tb2 + T2 )

(17)

We assume di , i = 1, 2 are constants at all dates.
In Assumption 1 the parameters (d12 , d21 ) capture the cross effects from
an increase of the temperature anomaly in one region on the damages of the
other region. In particular, d12 captures the effects of polar amplification in
region 2 on damages in region 1. Thus d1 = d11 +d21 is the aggregate impact
(i.e. the impact on both regions) from a temperature increase in region 1,
while d2 = (d12 + d22 ) is the aggregate impact from a temperature increase
in region 2. If we assume that the polar amplification effects on region 1 are
sufficiently strong, and d21 is negligible, then d2 > d1 might reflect strong
polar amplification effects.
The optimality conditions for co-state equations of the climate dynamics
of (??) imply
dλT1
dt
dλT2
dt





(B + γ 1 + γ 2 )
(γ 1 + γ 2 )
= ρ+
λT1 −
λT2 + d1
H
H


γ 
(B + γ 1 )
1
= −
λT1 + ρ +
λT2 + d2 ,
H
H

(18)
(19)

and the forward solutions of (??)-(??) are constants by Assumption 1. The
evolution of the co-states can be described by the linear dynamical system
λ̇T

= AλT + d

A =

ρ+

(B+γ 1 +γ 2 )
H
− γH1

−(γ 1 +γ 2 )
H
1)
ρ + (B+γ
H

!
, λT =

λT1
λT2

!
, d=

d1
d2

(20)
!
,

with terminal conditions at infinity determined by the steady state of the
Hamiltonian system associated with (??). System (??), along with temperature dynamics (??)-(??) in which emissions in each region are given by
the optimal emissions (??), constitute this Hamiltonian system which determines optimal paths for the temperature anomalies (T1 (t) , T2 (t)) , the
associated costate variables or shadow values (λT1 (t) , λT2 (t)) , the optimal
fossil fuel (or emission) path E (x, t) , and the corresponding steady states.
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From the steady state values for the costates can easily be obtained as


γ 1 d2 γ 2 d2
/Γ
λT1 = − βd1 +
+
H
H


γ 2 d2 γ 1 d1
λT2 = − βd2 +
/Γ
+
H
H
(B + γ 1 )
β = ρ+
.
H
 γ 2
γ2  γ1γ2 
1
2
Γ = β −
+β
−
.
H
H
H

4

(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)

Heat Transport and Climate Policy

The results of the welfare optimization problem can be used to explore
the impact of heat transport and polar amplification on climate policy. In
particular we are interested in calculating the error made if the planner
mistakenly ignores heat transfer T r in computing optimal carbon taxes. To
calculate this error we compute the solution by the planner who acts as if
T r = 0, but it is present in the actual climate. The planner mistakenly
replaces (??)-(??) with

dλ̂T1
dt
dλ̂T2
dt




B
= ρ+
λ̂T1 + d1
H


B
= ρ+
λ̂T2 + d2 ,
H

(25)
(26)

with the steady-state externality tax defined by

τ̂

=

λ̂T1

=



−λ λ̂T1 + λ̂T2
H
−d1
−d2
, λ̂T2 =
.
ρ + B/H
ρ + B/H

(27)
(28)

The planner’s incorrect tax rate may be compared with the correct
steady-state tax rate
τ=

−λ (λT1 + λT2 )
,
H

(29)

with (λT1 , λT2 ) given by (??)-(??).
From this point on, due to notational clutter, we set H = 1. As we can
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see from the above formulae, setting H = 1 just amounts to absorbing H
into the parameters λ, B, γ 1 , γ 2 because it always enters as a ratio.
It is convenient to write the correct tax rate τ (γ 1 , γ 2 ) as a function of
heat and moisture transport parameters (γ 1 , γ 2 ) as follows, using (??)-(??):
τ (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = −λ ((λT1 + λT2 ))
λ [(ρ + B + 2γ 1 ) (d1 + d2 ) + 2γ 2 d2 ]
=
(ρ + B + γ 1 )2 − γ 21 + (ρ + B + γ 1 ) γ 2 − γ 1 γ 2
λ [(ρ + B + 2γ 1 ) (d1 + d2 ) + 2γ 2 d2 ]
=
.
(ρ + B) (ρ + B + 2γ 1 + γ 2 )

(30)

Since the incorrect tax can be written as τ̂ = τ (γ 1 , 0) , i.e. the optimal tax
rate is the same as the planner’s optimal tax rate unless γ 2 > 0. The ratio
of the planner’s incorrect choice of “optimal” tax rate and the true tax rate
is

τ̂
τ (γ 1 , 0)
(d1 + d2 ) (ρ + B + 2γ 1 + γ 2 )
=
=
.
τ (γ 1 , γ 2 )
τ (γ 1 , γ 2 )
(ρ + B + 2γ 1 ) (d1 + d2 ) + 2γ 2 d2

(31)

It is informative to compute relative error in setting tax rates when γ 2 goes
to infinity. Using L’Hospital’s rule we obtain
τ (γ 1 , ∞)
2d2
=
τ (γ 1 , 0)
d1 + d2

(32)

We see from (??) that the correct tax rate can be as much as twice the
tax rate with no polar amplification due to heat and moisture transport (i.e.
when γ 2 = 0) when the share of region 2’s damages

d2
d1 +d2 ,

is one. We sum

up our discussion at this point in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 The planner who mistakenly ignores spatial heat transport
taxes carbon too little, i.e., when

τ (γ 1 ,0)
τ (γ 1 ,γ 2 )

< 1 if and only if, (d1 + d2 ) γ 2 <

2γ 2 d2 . It taxes carbon too much if and only if (d1 + d2 ) γ 2 > 2γ 2 d2 . Since
the damage share of the damage contributions from the warming of the high
latitudes is s2 ≡

d2
d1 +d2 ,

the direction of bias in carbon taxes in this model

from ignoring spatial heat transport is described by a very simple relation
between the damage shares and the two basic parameters of heat transport.
Proof. The computations above in equations (??) and (??) show that
τ̂
τ (γ 1 , 0)
=
≶ 1 if f (d1 + d2 ) γ 2 ≶ 2γ 2 d2
τ (γ 1 , γ 2 )
τ (γ 1 , γ 2 )
13

(33)

The key role of γ 2 > 0 in the above conclusions warrants some discussion. As Langen and Alexeev (2007) and Alexeev and Jackson (2012) stress,
γ 2 > 0 captures aspects of moisture transport in addition to aspects of heat
transport. A more elaborate model that includes both heat and moisture
transport is that of Fanning and Weaver (1996). The Langen and Alexeev (2007) and Alexeev and Jackson (2012) models can be usefully viewed
as abstractions that capture aspects of the more complicated Fanning and
Weaver (1996) model which, in turn, is a drastic simplification of the more
realistic Weaver et al. (2001) model.
We believe the analytical clarity in showing us how the ratio depends
upon marginal damages for each of the two regions of latitude belts as well
as the two basic parameters of heat and moisture transport counterbalances
the cost of abstracting away from more realistic features of damages and
heat and moisture transport dynamics.

4.1

A numerical simulation

In order to obtain some more insights into results obtained above, we proceed with a simple numerical exercise of the Hamiltonian system associated
with (??). To calibrate the model we adopt benchmark estimates from
the literature. In particular, following Langen and Alexeev (2007), we set
B = 0.1 PW/K (1 PW is 1015 W), γ 1 = γ 2 = 0.15 PW/K. For the heat
capacity H = πa2e ρd cw Hd we use the condition τ s = H/B, where, as in Langen and Alexeev (2007), τ s = (5.5 × 100 months)/12 and B = 0.1 PW/K
which implies that H = 4.58 (PW year)/K. For the value of the Matthews et
al. (2009) cumulative carbon response parameter λ, we consider that about
287.5 petagrams (PG) of cumulative emissions yield about 0.8◦ C increase in
global mean temperature and set 0.8 = λ × (0.287 teratons C). Thus λ =
2.787. Regarding the damage parameter in e−φ(x,T ) , we follow Brock et al.
(2013) and set the damage parameter of an exponential damage function
to 0.01. However we caution that the value of .01 was set for a global, non
spatial model. This value is considered to provide a decent approximation to
the quadratic damage function used in Nordhaus (2007) (e.g. a temperature
increase of 4◦ C corresponds to ≈ 5% loss of output). There is a considerable
literature suggesting that the poorest and most vulnerable groups will disproportionately experience the negative effects of climate change and that
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such changes are likely to impact significantly on developing world countries,
where natural-resource dependency is high (see for example Thomas and
Twyman 2005). In our set up region 1 which corresponds to latitudes from
0◦ N to 30◦ N includes mainly developing world countries. Thus we expect a
relatively high d11 and also a high d12 under polar amplification. Parameter
d11 will tend to increase the value of d1 = d11 + d21 while d12 will tend to increase the value of d2 = d12 +d22 . In the absence of more specific information
about the relative sizes of these parameters, we adopt two alternative assumptions for marginal damages. In the first (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008), while
in the second (d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014) which reflects strong polar amplification effects. This allows us to explore the impact of reversing the ranking of
damages in each region and numerically verify proposition 1. For the rest
of the parameters we use L (1) = L (2) = 0.5 since evidence suggests that
50% of the global population lives above 27◦ , α = 0.05, ρ = 0.02. Finally at
the first stage of the simulation we assume equal welfare weights between
the two regions, v (1) = v (2) = 1.
The simulation proceeds as follows. Using (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008) and
assuming infinite fossil fuel reserves, we define the Hamiltonian system,
dT1
dt
dT2
dt
dλT1
dt
dλT2
dt
∆f

1
[(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + ∆f ] , T1 (0) = 0
H
1
=
[(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + ∆f ] , T2 (0) = 0
H



(B + γ 1 + γ 2 )
(γ 1 + γ 2 )
= ρ+
λT1 −
λT2 + d1
H
H


γ 
(B + γ 1 )
1
= −
λT1 + ρ +
λT2 + d2
H
H
= λE (t) , E (t) = E (1, t) + E (2, t)
−αv (x) L (x) H
P
,
E (x, t) =
2
−λ
i=1 λTi (t)
=

(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)


and compute the steady state z = T̄1 , T̄2 , λ̄T1 , λ̄T1 , which for our parametrization is z = (3.38262, 5.91959, −0.267593, −0.224763) . The steady state has
the saddle point property with eigenvalues e = (0.140087, −0.120087, 0.0418341, −0.0218341) .
To obtain insights into the optimal paths for the state and the costate variables, we solve the linear approximation of the Hamiltonian system around
the steady state. Setting the constants associated with positive eigenvalues equal to zero and using initial and steady state values for the state
15

Figure 2: Paths for the temperature anomalies
variable, we compute the remaining constants and the initial values for the
costates. We obtain the paths for temperature anomalies and the corresponding costate variables. The paths for the temperature anomalies are
shown in Figure 2, where polar amplification under the optimal policy is
clear.
Figure 3 presents the externality tax when the planner takes explicitly
into account heat and moisture transport. The figure shows that the optimal policy ramp is not gradual but requires a high externality tax at the
beginning which declines and eventually converges to its steady state. Since
s2 ≡

d2
d1 +d2

< 1/2 at the steady state, τ̂ > τ .

Figure 4 presents the corresponding optimal path for emissions.
When we reverse the order of marginal damages, i.e., (d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014) ,
to allow for strong polar amplification effects the qualitative characteristics of the solution are the same. In this case the steady state is z =
(5.95424, 10.4199, −0.258294, −0.301124) . Figure 5 presents the path for the
optimal externality tax τ (t) along with the corresponding externality tax τ̂ .
Since s2 > 1/2 at the steady state, τ̂ < τ . Thus ignoring polar amplification
causes undertaxing.
Finally we consider the case in which (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008) but (v (1) , v (2)) =
(1.25, 1) . That is, the welfare weight attached to region 1 is 25% higher than
the weight attached to region 2. The qualitative characteristics of the solu16

Figure 3: The externality tax (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008)

Figure 4: Optimal emission path
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Figure 5: The externality tax (d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014)
tion are the same but the optimal fossil fuel paths are different now. In this
case fossil fuel use is higher in region 1 as shown in figure 6.

4.2

Polar Amplification and Adaptation Policy

We augment the above model by considering the possibility of mitigation
of industrial emissions through abatement. Let A (x, t) denote abatement
expenses undertaken in each region in order to reduce damages from global
warming. We assume that the cost of adaptation A (x, t) can be expressed
as a function of output, Y (x, t) = y (x, t) E (x, t)a , as ξ (A (x, t)) Y (x, t) .
So output after adaptation is [1 − ξ (A (x, t))] Y (x, t) . In order to obtain
tractable results we consider a linear function for ξ (µ) = A (x, t) θ (x) , where
θ (x) is a region specific parameter of adaptation cost. Damages after adaptation are given by exp [−φ (x) [(Tb + T (x, t)) − b (x) A (x, t))]] where b (x)
captures the effectiveness of adaptation in region x = 1, 2. We extend Assumption 1 for the case of adaptation to
0

Assumption 1 : Define marginal damage cost of temperature increase
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Figure 6: Optimal emission paths v (1) > v (2)
di and marginal damage savings from abatement bx in region i, x = 1, 2 by
di =

x=2
X
x=1

bx =

v (x) L (x)

∂ [φ (x) [(Tb + T (x, t)) − b (x) A (x, t))]]
, i = 1,(40)
2
∂Ti

∂ [φ (x) [(Tb + T (x, t)) − b (x) A (x, t))]]
, x = 1, 2
∂A (x, t)

(41)

Under these assumptions the relevant Hamiltonian function can be written as:
H =

x=2
X

v (x) L (x) [ln {[1 − A (x, t) θ (x)] E (x, t)a } − φ (x, Tb + T, A (x))]) − λR0x E (x, t) +
x=1

1
[(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + λ [E (1, t) + E (2, t)]] +
H
1
λT2 [(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + λ [E (1, t) + E (2, t)]]
H
Tb = (Tb1 , Tb2 ) , T = (T1 , T2 )
λT1

φ (x, Tb + T, A (x)) = φ (x) [(Tb + T (x, t)) − b (x) A (x, t))] .
In this formulation the planner chooses optimal fossil fuel use, E (x, t) , and
adaptation expenditure, A (x, t). Optimality conditions for fossil use and
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(42)

adaptation imply that
αv (x) L (x)
E (x, t)
θ (x)
1 − A (x) θ (x)

−λ [λT1 + λT2 ]
+ λR0x (t) = 0
H
bx − θ (x)
= bx , or A (x) =
, x = 1, 2.
bx θ (x)

=

(43)
(44)

Condition (??) implies that as long as bx − θ (x) > 0, the corresponding
region will undertake adaptation. Since adaptation expenditure does not
affect temperature dynamics and the damage function is linear in adaptation and separable between temperature and adaptation, the optimal paths
and steady states for the temperature anomaly fossil fuel use and optimal
taxes remain the same as in the case in which adaptation was not available.
In this simple model emissions and adaptation are independent. Adaptation expenditure will affect temperature dynamics, emissions and taxes, if
it affects the costate variables through a damage function that allows for a
link between adaptation and temperature.

5

Welfare Cost of Ignoring Heat and Moisture
Transport

While the computation of qualitative effects of spatial transport on optimal
emissions tax rates analyzed above is useful, it does not tell us much about
the economic importance of taking spatial heat and moisture into account,
i.e. we need to compute the impact on economic welfare measures. We turn
to this task now.
Suppose a planner mistakenly believes that heat and moisture transport
is not present, i.e. (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0, 0) but the true dynamics are γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0.
How big is the error in welfare units and how big is the error in energy use
and emissions taxes? We formulate a conceptual framework and study these
questions here.
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Consider the social welfare optimization problem
V [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] ≡
(45)
"x=2
#
Z ∞
h
i
X
e−(ρ−η)t
max
v (x) L0 (x) ln y (x, t) E (x, t)α e−φ(x)(T ) dt
t=0

x=1

subject to
Z ∞X
x=2
x=2
X
E (x, t) dt ≤
R0 x) ≡ R0
t=0 x=1

(46)

x=1

Ṫ1 = [(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + λE (t)] , T1 (0) = 0

(47)

Ṫ2 = [(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + λE (t)] , T2 (0) = 0

(48)

E (t) = E (1, t) + E (2, 4) .

(49)

Here, as in Section 2, T (t) = Tb + T (t) and we have assumed that population grows at the same rate η in each region, so that L (x, t) = L0 (x) eηt .
We have also denoted the optimal value by V [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] when the
planner believes the transport parameters are (γ 1 , γ 2 ) and the true transport
parameters are, (γ 1 , γ 2 ). We denote the value when the planner believes the
transport parameters (a1 .a2 ) 6= (γ 1 , γ 2 ) but the true transport parameters
are (γ 1 , γ 2 ) by V [(a1 .a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )].
By construction we have
V [(a1 .a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] ≤ V [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] ,

(50)

for all (a1 .a2 ) ≥ (0, 0) . Hence we may use the relative error measure,
ψ=

V [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] − V [(a1 .a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )]
≥ 0,
V [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )]

(51)

as an economic measure of the error made by a planner who believes (a1 .a2 )
when the true parameters are (γ 1 , γ 2 ).
We use similar notation for total emissions at date t, E [(a1 .a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )]
and the temperature anomalies T1 [(a1 .a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )], T2 [(a1 .a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )]
for the planner who believes the transport parameters are (a1 .a2 ) but the
true parameters are (γ 1 , γ 2 ).
The computational procedure can borrow a lot of material from Section
3, once we recognize that the beliefs of the planner determine the co-state
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variables for the two temperature anomalies,9
λ̇T1

= [ρ − η + (B + a1 + a2 )] λT1 − [(a1 + a2 )] λT2 + d1

(52)

λ̇T2

= −a1 λT1 + [ρ − η + (B + a1 )] λT2 + d2 .

(53)

The steady-state solutions for the costate variables are given by (??)-(??)
with H = 1 and (γ 1 , γ 2 ) replaced by (a1 .a2 ) . To put it another way, “beliefs”
about the parameters of the temperature dynamics determine the co-state
equations (??)-(??). Those beliefs determine the externality tax associated
with anthropogenic emissions of GHGs
τ (a1 , a2 ) = −λ (λT1 + λT2 ) =

λ [(ρ − η + B + 2a1 ) (d1 + d2 ) + 2a2 d2 ]
.
(ρ − η + B) (ρ − η + B + 2a1 + a2 )
(54)

This externality tax determines emissions according to

∞

"x=2
X

t=0

x=1

Z

E (x, t, (a1 , a2 )) =
#

αv (x) L0 (x)
(55)
τ (a1 , a2 ) + λR0 (a1 , a2 ) e(ρ−η)t

E (x, t, (a1 , a2 )) dt = R0 .

(56)

The true transport parameters now determine the actual paths of the temperature anomalies,
Ṫ1 = [(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + λE (t, (a1 .a2 ))] , T1 (0) = 0 (57)
Ṫ2 = [(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + λE (t, (a1 .a2 ))] , T2 (0) = 0.(58)
Using (??)-(??) and (??), the steady-state temperature anomalies can be
obtained as
T1 =
T2 =

αλ [v (1) L0 (1) + v (2) L0 (2)] (B + 2γ 2 )


B (B + 2γ 1 + γ 2 ) τ (a1 , a2 ) + λR0 (0) e(ρ−η)t
αλ [v (1) L0 (1) + v (2) L0 (2)] [B + 2 (γ 1 + γ 2 )]

.
B (B + 2γ 1 + γ 2 ) τ (a1 , a2 ) + λR0 (0) e(ρ−η)t

(59)
(60)

In computing the welfare effects, it is convenient to separate out in (??)
9

Note that we have set H = 1.
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the term
Z

∞

e

−(ρ−η)t

"x=2
X

t=0

#
v (x) L0 (x) ln [y0 (x, t) − φ (x) Tb (x)] dt,

(61)

x=1

which does not vary with emissions and compute the component of welfare
which does vary with emissions. Hence we focus on the variable component
of welfare in equation (??) below. We denote this component, when beliefs
are correct, by
Z

∞

W [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] ≡ max

e−(ρ−η)t

t=0

"x=2
X

#
h
i
v (x) L0 (x) ln E (x, t)α e−φ(x)Tx (t) dt,

x=1

(62)
with analogous notation for the variable component of welfare, W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] ,
when beliefs about the parameters of the temperature anomaly dynamics are (a1 , a2 ) but the true parameters are (γ 1 , γ 2 ) . It is very tedious to
compute W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] for the case of finite known reserve, R0 . We
proceed as follows noting that from the FONC, optimal emissions when
the tax is τ (a1 , a2 ) are given by (??).

In the variable welfare compo-

nent (??), substitute optimal emissions (??) and steady state temperature
anomalies (??)-(??). Next we gather all terms in W [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] that
are common to τ (a1 , a2 ) + λR0 (a1 , a2 ) e(ρ−η)t , and separate out terms in
W [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] that are not. Define the following quantities:

w1 =

x=2
X

v (x) L0 (x) [α ln (αv (x) L0 (x))]

(63)

v (x) L0 (x)

(64)

x=1

w2 =

x=2
X
x=1

λ
w3 =

DT

P



x=2
x=1 αv (x) L0 (x)

×
DT
× [v (1) φ (1) (B + 2γ 1 ) + v (2) φ (2) (B + 2γ 1 + 2γ 2 )]

= (B + γ 1 ) (B + γ 1 + γ 2 ) − γ 1 (γ 1 + γ 2 ) .
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(65)

(66)

Using these quantities we obtain
W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] =

Z ∞
−(ρ−η)t
e
w1 − w2 ln (ζ (a1 , a2 )) −
t=0

(67)


w3
dt
ζ (a1 , a2 )

ζ (a1 , a2 ) = τ (a1 , a2 ) + λR0 (a1 , a2 ) e(ρ−η)t ,

(68)

where λR0 (a1 , a2 ) solves the equation,
Z

∞

"
=

t=0

x=2
X
αv (x) L0 (x)
x=1

ζ (a1 , a2 )

#
dt = R0 .

(69)

We can obtain some insight by computing W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] for the
case of infinite known reserve because in this case λR0 (a1 , a2 ) = 0 and we
can obtain steady states and compute W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] for these steady
states. However, we know that unless ρ̂ ≡ ρ − η = 0, optimal steady states
do not typically solve a maximization problem. Hence we restrict ourselves
to the study of steady states for the case ρ̂ ≡ ρ − η = 0 and adjust the values
of the weights wi , i = 1, 2, 3 accordingly.
When ρ̂ ≡ ρ − η = 0 an optimal steady state solves the problem.

(70)
W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] ≡
(x=2
)
X
max
αv (x) L0 (x) ln E ((a1 , a2 ) , x) − [E ((a1 , a2 ) , 1) + E ((a1 , a2 ) , 2)] h (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ,
x=1

where
d (x) ≡ v (x) L0 (x) φ (x) , x = 1, 2
(71)
λ
h (γ 1 , γ 2 ) =
[d (1) (B + 2γ 1 ) + d (2) (B + 2γ 1 + 2γ 2 )](72)
DT (γ 1 , γ 2 )
DT (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ≡ (B + γ 1 ) (B + γ 1 + γ 2 ) − γ 1 (γ 1 + γ 2 ) ,
(73)
and {E ((a1 , a2 ) , x) , x = 1, 2} solves the problem
max
E(1),E(2)

(x=2
X

)
αv (x) L0 (x) ln E (x) − [E (1) + E (2)] h (a1 , a2 ) .

x=1
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(74)

We may now compute
W [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] − W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] =
"
"x=2
##
X
[z − ln (z + 1)]
αv (x) L0 (x) ,

(75)
(76)

x=1

z≡

h (γ 1 , γ 2 )
.
h (a1 , a2 )

(77)

Since the function z − (ln z + 1) is strictly convex and takes a unique
minimum at z = 1, then,
z − (ln z + 1) > 0, for all z 6= 1.
Using (??) we examine the ratio

h(γ 1 ,γ 2 )
h(0,a)

(78)

to determine how far from one

it can be. Some tedious algebra yields the formula
h (γ 1 , γ 2 )
h (0, 0)

=

si ≡

1
[B + 2γ 1 s1 + 2 (γ 1 + γ 2 ) s2 ]
(B + 2γ 1 + γ 2 )
d (i)
, i = 1, 2.
d (1) + d (2)

Note that when, γ 2 = 0 we have

h(γ 1 ,0)
h(0,0)

= 1. If γ 2 → ∞, then

(79)
(80)

h(γ 1 ,γ 2 )
h(0,0)

→

2s2 . Some additional algebra shows that if s2 = 0, then γ 2 → ∞ implies
h(γ 1 ,γ 2 )
h(0,0)

→ 0 and also it is always the case that

furthest from one for the ratio
If z ≡

h(γ 1 ,γ 2 )
h(0,0)

h(γ 1 ,γ 2 )
h(0,0)

h(γ 1 ,γ 2 )
h(0,0)

≤ 2. Hence the

are the extreme points zero and two.

in (??)-(??), we see that the “loss” is infinite when z → 0.

Proposition 2 (Bounds on costs of wrong beliefs about transport parameters)

W [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] − W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] → ∞ , when z → 0
x=2
X
W [(γ 1 , γ 2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] − W [(a1 , a2 ) | (γ 1 , γ 2 )] → [1 − ln(2)]
αv (x) L0 (x) ,
x=1

when z → 2.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above.
As we saw from the discussion above, when s2 = 0, i.e. marginal damages
at the high latitudes are zero then a planner who mistakenly believes γ 2 is
zero when in reality γ 2 is very large makes a serious loss relative to planning
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Figure 7: Welfare cost (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0.15, 0.15) , (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008)
under correct beliefs. The main message from Proposition 2 is that it is very
important to avoid the mistaken belief that γ 2 is small when the damage
share of the high latitudes is small and the true value of γ 2 is large.
A picture of the cost caused by wrong beliefs can be obtained by using Assumption 1 and the calibration of the previous section to explicitly compute (??)-(??). The results are presented in Figures 7 and 8 for
the cases in which (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0, 15, 0.15), (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008) , and
(d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014) respectively and in Figures 9 and 10 for the cases
in which (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0, 15, 0.25), (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008) , and (d1 , d2 ) =
(0.008, 0.014) respectively. Figure 11 presents the cost for the case in which
s2 = 0, i.e. marginal damages at the high latitudes are zero, the true transport coefficients are (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0, 15, 0.25) and the planner is mistaken and
believes that the true parameters are (a1 , a2 ) .
From the above figures it becomes clear that the maximum welfare cost
occurs when transport coefficients are completely ignored, or (a1 .a2 ) =
(0, 0) . On the other hand, correct beliefs about the transport coefficients,
i.e. (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (a1 .a2 ) , do not imply any welfare cost. It can also be seen
from the figures that the welfare cost for wrong beliefs increases with γ 2 .
The welfare cost also increases when d1 > d2 and transport coefficients are
ignored. These simulation results confirm, therefore, our theoretical results.
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Figure 8: Welfare cost (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0.15, 0.15) , (d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014)

Figure 9: Welfare cost (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0.15, 0.25) , (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008)
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Figure 10: Welfare cost (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0.15, 0.25) , (d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014)

Figure 11: Welfare cost (γ 1 , γ 2 ) = (0.15, 0.25) , (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.0)
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We suspect that the lessons taught from Proposition 2 will carry over to
the more complicated general problems but more analysis and computational
work is needed in future research. We use the remaining space in this paper
to examine the potential impact of spatial heat and moisture transport on
equilibrium market discount rates, discussed in the following section.

6

Impact of Spatial Heat and Moisture Transport
on Market Discount Rates

There is a substantial literature on the choice of the market discount rate, or
the consumption discount rate, which is appropriate for discounting future
costs and benefits associated with environmental projects (e.g., Arrow et al.
1996; Weitzman 1998, 2001; Newell and Pizer 2003). In this section we are
interested in determining discount rates in each of the two regions when heat
and moisture transport are taken into account. The consumption discount
rate can be defined by the equilibrium condition in two equivalent ways: (i)
following Arrow et al. (2014) and considering a social planner who would
be indifferent between $1 received at time t and $ε received today when
the marginal utility of $ε today equals the marginal utility of $1 at time
t, or (ii) following Gollier (2007) and considering a marginal investment in
a zero coupon bond which leaves the marginal utility of the representative
agent unchanged. Consider a general utility function u (c (t) , q (t)) of material goods consumption, c (t) , and climate quality, q (t). Recall that under
the equilibrium conditions above, the deterministic market discount rate is
defined by
d
r (t) ≡ ρ − ln
dt



∂u (c (t) , q (t))
∂c


.

(81)

Hence, in the additive separable case, i.e., if u (c, q) = u1 (c) + u2 (q) as
in, for example, the log utility case examined in Section 3 above, we see right
away from (??) that climate quality effects in utility have no direct effect on
the discount rate . Climate quality must enter through the direct effect on
consumption to matter for the discount rate, although it could impact production of consumption per capita, c (x, t) = y (x, t) E (x, t)α , where y (x, t)
is interpreted as in (??). If climate change damages consumption so that
actual consumption is c (t) = e−D(T (t)) cP (t) where cP (t) is potential consumption when climate is pristine, and e−D(T (t)) is the “shrinking” factor
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due to damages to potential consumption from climate change, then one can
get an impact on the market discount rate from this channel. Notice that
if the utility function is homogeneous of degree one in (c, q), as in many
popular specifications, e.g. C.E.S, then ∂ 2 u (c, q) /∂c∂q ≥ 0. This restriction imposes a limit on what kind of effects climate change can have on the
market rate discount of if u (c, q) is homogeneous of degree one.
Our main interest here is comparing market discount rates in the two
regions x = 1, 2 and comparing the impact of spatial heat and moisture
transport on market discount rates. Looking ahead and thinking about the
economics before doing any computations, we can see from the definitional
formula for the market discount rate the following intuitions.
First, any force that increases (decreases) the growth rate of consumption
of over time is likely to increase (decrease) the market rate of discount for
the simple reason that the extra utility from an extra unit of consumption
at date t is smaller (larger) relative to date 0, the richer (poorer) the future
at date t. For example if climate quality impacts productivity, e.g. y (x, t) =
Y (x, q (x, t) , t), then a decline in climate quality that decreases productivity
could lead to a poorer future and a decrease in the market rate of discount
in region x.
Second, any effect of climate change that makes the extra utility from an
extra unit of consumption at date t worth less than an extra unit of utility
from an extra unit of consumption at date 0 will increase the market rate
of discount. For example the force of mortality might increase due to future
climate change. This effect is like an increase in ρ in (??).
Third, if we introduce adaptation by diverting some of c (t) into mitigating negative effects of decreasing climate quality, e.g. hot climate regions
expending consumption resources to mitigate extreme heat, then this effect
impacts the market rate of discount depending upon whether this type of
increasing cost of adaptation effect makes the effective marginal utility of
consumption worth more (or worth less) in the future than it is worth today. Of course this effect could go the other way. For example adapting to
extreme cold weather in the high latitudes may become easier which could
lead to a higher market rate of discount in cold regions because “effective
income” available for consumption will increase.
We work through some examples below.
Case 1: U (c, q) = u (cq) , u0 > 0, u00 < 0.
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Consider the case
c (x, t) q (x, t) = y (x, t) E (x, t)a e−φ(x)T̂ (x,t)

(82)

q (x, t) = e−φ(x)T̂ (x,t) , c (x, t) = y (x, t) E (x, t)a

(83)

T̂ (x, t) = Tb (x) + T (x, t) .

(84)

For this case we have



d ∂U
∂U
r (x, t) = ρ −
/
=
dt ∂c
∂c
ċ (x, t)
= ρ+σ
+ (1 − σ) φ (x) Ṫ (x)
c (x, t)
−u00 (z) z
σ (z) ≡
.
u0 (z)

(85)
(86)
(87)

Here σ (z) is the relative rate of risk aversion (RRA) and 1/σ (z) is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
estimate ρ where we identify our ρ with their implied ρ in the formula,
β = 0.940 = 1/ (1 + ρ) , as around 4 to 4.5 percent because they estimate
their discount factor as around .940. They estimate RRA, σ’s, in the range
[0.5, 1.4]. These numbers can be used to get some idea of the magnitudes
of the economic parameters (ρ, γ) in (??) above and in what follows. Note
that
ċ (x, t)
ẏ (x, t)
Ė (x, t)
=
+a
,
c (x, t)
y (x, t)
E (x, t)

(88)

which determines the rate of growth of consumption in each spatial region
by the corresponding growth rate of inputs and technical change other than
fossil fuels in use, (ẏ/y), plus the rate of growth of the fossil fuel use, (Ė/E),
weighted by the the energy share in production a. The term (Ė/E) might
be expected to be negative due to the rising shadow price of reserves. In
reality, however, it may be positive for a while before turning negative,
due to the inability of the world to coordinate on reducing emissions and
the continual discovery of new reserves and new technologies for extracting
previously un-extractable reserves. Regarding a, we have seen estimates of
energy’s share in U. S. output, as high as 8%, but a value around 0.05 could
be a reasonable choice. World growth rates of consumption per capita and
output per capita vary from high positive growth rates in China that have
reached 10% to even negative growth rates in some countries. A range of
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2 to 4 percent can be used to choose rough numbers. Formula (??) can
thus be regarded as a Ramsey rule for the discount rate in spatial region
x = 1, 2 adjusted by damages associated with temperature growth in each
region which are weighted by 1 minus the RRA. When spatial transport
phenomena are present, emissions in region 1 affect temperature in region 2
through polar amplification and affect therefore the discount rate for region
2. Since we are using the Matthews et al. (2009) modeling of the temperature anomaly response to cumulative emissions in both regions, it would
be plausible to assume that Ṫ (x) is proportional to cumulative emissions,
which is another way of looking at the link between emissions in region 1
and the discount rate n region 2. This discussion suggests that a natural
mechanisms such a spatial transport and polar amplification may generate
interactions between the discount rates used in cost benefit analysis in different geographical regions. At the present, however, we do not have reliable
estimates for marginal damages per degree of regional temperature increase,
or data on regional temperature increases for the regions defined by the
Langen and Alexeev (2007) and Alexeev and Jackson (2012) models to produce reasonable estimates for discount rates. Obtaining these data would
undoubtedly provide insights in obtaining spatially differentiated discount
rates for cost benefit analysis purposes.
Case 2: U (c, q) = u (c, q) concave and increasing in both variables.
In this case we have



d ∂U
∂U
r (x, t) = ρ −
/
=
dt ∂c
∂c
ucq q̇
ċ (x, t)
= ρ+σ
−q
c (x, t)
uc q
ucq
ċ (x, t)
= ρ+σ
+q
φ (x) Ṫ (x, t) .
c (x, t)
uc

(89)
(90)
(91)

Here subscripts on the utility function denote partial derivatives. Notice
that when Ṫ (x) > 0, the direct effect on the market discount rate of the
cross partial derivative, ucq , is positive (negative) on r (x, t) when ucq is
positive (negative ). Since γ 2 governs the strength of polar amplification,
the larger γ 2 is, the larger will be the direct effect of polar amplification on
r (2, t).
Recall that polar amplification implies that the direct effect on market
discount rate in the high latitude region of a one degree rise in global yearly
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average temperature is larger for the higher than for the lower latitudes. This
effect of polar amplification may have interesting implications for capital
flows across the two regions that have been neglected until now due to
the neglect of heat and moisture transport in most of climate economics
modeling.
Finally, Moyer et al. (2014) have shown that if climate change has
negative effects on growth rates as well as levels of GDP the impact can
be quite dramatic. We do a crude exercise here to illustrate a potential
effect of this kind.
Case 3: y (x, t) = A (q (x, t) , x, t) , U (c (x, t)) , q (x, t) = u (c (x, t) , q (x, t))
where A (q (x, t) , x, t) is a productivity index that increases as climate
quality increases. In this case we have, by adapting (??) above,


r (x, t) =
=
=
=


d ∂U
∂U
ρ−
/
=
(92)
dt ∂c
∂c
ċ (x, t) qucq q̇
ρ+σ
−
(93)
c (x, t)
uc q
ċ (x, t) qucq
+
φ (x) Ṫ (x, t)
(94)
ρ+σ
c (x, t)
uc


 qu
qAq 
cq
ρ+σ
−φ (x) Ṫ (x, t) +
φ (x) Ṫ (x, t) . (95)
A
uc

We see the Moyer et al. (2014) impact operating on the market rate of
discount by having a negative direct effect on r (x, t). The economic intuition
for this direct effect is the increase in marginal utility of consumption in a
poorer future compared to the marginal utility of consumption today. The
future is expected to be poorer because the derivative Aq > 0 by assumption
and (q̇/q) due to negative climate change. Note that

qAq
A

and

qucq
uc

are

elasticities of A and uq w.r.t. climate quality.
We have ignored modeling capital accumulation as in Ramsey, Cass,
Koopmans type macro-growth modeling in the two box model in order to
focus entirely on the effects of spatial heat and moisture transport. We
turn now to some very preliminary work on extending the classical Ramsey,
Cass, Koopmans model, “Ramsey model” for short, to the two-box climate
dynamics setting.
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7

Two-Box Ramsey Type Models

This section develops Ramsey type modeling in the context of Alexeev and
Jackson (2012), and Langen and Alexeev (2007) two-region climate models. We continue to make rather drastic simplifying assumptions but we
ultimately would like to be able to move towards a two region (or many
regions) extension of the important work of Cai et al. (2015).
In developing the Ramsey model, we explicitly consider a Cobb-Douglas
production function in each region,
Y (x, t) = A (x, t) K (x, t)αK L (x, t)αL E (x, t)αE , x = 1, 2,

(96)

where K (x, t) is the stock of capital and A (x, t) is a productivity factor.
Using this production function the capital budget constraint for each region
becomes
K̇ (x, t) = Y (x, t) − C (x, t) − δK (x, t) , x = 1, 2.

(97)

We consider a deterministic Ramsey two-region optimization model which
we will refer to as the ”closed economy” problem. In this model each region
is limited by its own budget constraint. The particular assumptions connected to this scenario are restrictive and perhaps not so realistic but they
help to set up a benchmark model that can be compared with the other polar case in which the economy is completely open with free flows of capital,
fossil fuel and consumption goods across locations. The Hamiltonian associated with this problem, with only the relevant parts of the Hamiltonian
appearing is
H =

x=2
X


v (x) L (x, t) [α ln C (x, t) − φ (x, Tb + T )] − λR0x (t) E (x, t) (98)
+

x=1

1
[(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + λ [E (1, t) + E (2, t)]] + (99)
H
1
λT2 (t) [(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + λ [E (1, t) + E (2, t)]](100)
H
x=2
X
λK (x, t) [Y (x, t) − C (x, t) − δK (x, t)] .
(101)
λT1 (t)

x=1

To be able to study steady states we make the simplifying assumptions
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of infinite reserves, so that λR0x (0) = 0, constant population and no productivity growth in each region so that L (x, t) = L (x) , A (x, t) = A (x) . Under
these simplifying assumptions, the optimality condition for the two-region
Ramsey model can be written as follows. For the controls C(x, t), E (x, t):
αv (x) L (x)
C(x, t)
λ
(λT1 (t) + λT2 (t))
H

= λK (x, t) or C 0 (x, t) =

αv (x) L (x)
λK (x, t)

(102)

= −λK (x, t) Z (x) αE K (x, t)αK E (x, t)aE −1 (103)
or

 1
− (λT1 (t) + λT2 (t)) (λ/H) aE −1
0
E (x, t) =
(104)
λK (x, t) Z (x) αE K (x, t)αK
Z (x) = A (x) L (x)αL .
(105)

Using Assumption 1, the Hamiltonian dynamical system in the states and
the costates becomes:
Ṫ1 =
Ṫ2 =
K̇ (x, t) =
λ̇T1

=

λ̇T2

=

λ̇K (x, t) =



1 
(−B − γ 1 − γ 2 ) T1 + γ 1 T2 + λ E 0 (1, t) + E 0 (2, t) (106)
H


1 
(γ 1 + γ 2 ) T1 + (−B − γ 1 ) T2 + λ E 0 (1, t) + E 0 (2, t)
(107)
H
Z (x) K (x, t)αK E 0 (x, t)αE − C 0 (x, t) − δK (x, t) , x =(108)
1, 2




(γ 1 + γ 2 )
(B + γ 1 + γ 2 )
λT1 −
λT2 + d1
(109)
ρ+
H
H


γ 
(B + γ 1 )
λT2 + d2
(110)
− 1 λT1 + ρ +
H
H
i
h
ρ + δ − Z (x) αE K (x, t)αK −1 E 0 (x, t)aE λK (x, t) . (111)

The complexity of the Hamiltonian system does not allow analytical
results so we obtain some insight by resorting to simulations. We use the
parameters of section 4.1 for the climate system, while for the production
system we consider the following values
αK = 0.35, aL = 0.60, aE = 0.05, A(1) = A(2) = 1, δ = 0.05.

(112)

Table 1 presents steady-state values for state, costate, and control variλ
ables the steady state externality tax, which can be defined as τ = − (λT1 + λT2 ) H
,

for three cases: (i) γ 1 = γ 2 = 0.15, (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008) ; (ii) γ 1 = γ 2 = 0,
i.e. no spatial transport, (d1 , d2 ) = (0.014, 0.008); and (iii) γ 1 = γ 2 = 0.15,
(d1 , d2 ) = (0.008, 0.014) .
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Table 1: Steady states of the Ramsey two-box model
Case
T1
T2
K (x)
λT1
λT2
λK (x) C (x)

E (x)

τ

(i)

2.661

4.657

0.508

−0.267

−0.225

0.866

0.076

0.037

0.300

(ii)

3.507

3.507

0.488

−0.335

−0.191

0.901

0.073

0.033

0.320

(iii) 2.451 4.289 0.471 −0.258 −0.301 0.935 0.071 0.029
x = 1, 2. All the steady states have the saddle point property with four

0.340

negative eigenvalues.
Cases (i) and (iii) provide the optimal amplification given the parameters
of the climate system and the damage parameters, while case (ii) provides
the optimal steady state without any polar amplification when spatial transport phenomena are ignored. The steady-state values suggest that spatial
transport matters since, if we consider the no transport case as a benchmark,
accounting for heat and moisture transport results in a ±6.5% variation in
the steady state tax, and in a ±12.1% variation in the steady state consumption and fossil fuel use. Thus ignoring polar amplification may result
in overtaxing or under taxing fossil fuel use.

8

Conclusions

Polar amplification is an established scientific fact which has been associated with the surface albedo feedback and, by recent research, to heat and
moisture transport from the Equator to the Poles. In the present paper we
unify a two-box (or two-region) climate model, which allows for heat and
moisture transport from the southern region to the northern region, with an
economic model of welfare optimization. In the economic model a regulator chooses fossil fuel use which is equivalent to GHG emissions. Emissions
induce temperature anomaly, relative to baseline temperature in the two
regions, along with damages from temperature increase over the baseline.
Our main contribution is to show that by ignoring spatial heat and moisture transport and the resulting polar amplification the regulator may overestimate or underestimate the tax on GHG emissions. The direction of bias
depends on the relations between marginal damages from temperature increase in each region. We also determine the welfare cost when a regulator
mistakenly ignores spatial heat and moisture transport. Numerical simulations that use a plausible parametrization based on climate science confirm
our theoretical results regarding taxation of GHGs.
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D’Autume et al. (2015) study carbon taxation in second best frameworks as well as settings where lump sum compensatory transfers are possible and where they are not possible. They locate a set of sufficient conditions for carbon taxes to be uniform across locations, especially if lump sum
compensatory transfers are available. However, under the realistic political
constraints on transferring resources across countries, they find that equity
concerns force carbon taxes to be lower for poorer areas. Brock et al. (2013),
Brock et al. (2014b) and Brock and Xepapadeas (2015), in a model of continuous space that allows for spatial heat transport show that externality
taxes, (i.e. carbon prices) should be uniform when compensatory transfers
are possible, but tend to be lower in poorer areas when such transfers are
not available. They also show how heat transport impacts the set of spatial
carbon prices across locations. In the context of the present results it will
be interesting to study the impact of heat transport and polar amplification
of the potential spatial differentiation between rich and poor regions when
compensatory transfers among regions are not possible.
Using our framework we also calculate the discount rate for discounting
cost and benefit flows in cost-benefit analysis we show that polar amplification emission in the southern region may affect through the discount rates
in the northern region. In order to produce analytic results, our economic
model is simple and does not allow for capital accumulation. In the last
section we show how the two-region model with polar amplification can be
unified with a Ramsey type optimal growth model. Numerical simulations
indicate that the steady states of the economic and the climate systems
obtained with and without spatial heat and moisture transport differ from
each other. This result confirms that ignoring spatial phenomena and polar
amplification in climate change may result in suboptimal policies.
Further research - apart from introducing factors like human capital,
R&D, or uncertainty - could study pollution externalities from fossil fuel
emissions. Their effects can be modeled by introducing an extra state variable for each box together with transport across the two boxes. Some of these
externalities may be as important as the climate change externalities.10
10

For example, Parry et al. (2014) estimate co-benefits from the control of such pollutants for 20 major polluting countries. They show that co-benefits vary widely across the
20 countries but are substantial for all of them.
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